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This thesis will examine the ethnic conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, 
Abkhazia, and Adjara, and how the Soviet nationality policy affected each of these 
conflicts in the following ways. First, the policy placed all of the ethnic groups in the 
Soviet Union into a strict hierarchy, creating power differentials between ethnic groups 
that had previously been on an equal footing under Imperial Russian rule. Second, some 
ethnic groups were divided across multiple union republics in order to weaken their 
political power, hindering their ability to advocate for themselves when conflicts arose. 
Third, because the autonomy level of each ethnic group was laid out in the Soviet 
constitution, any change in status could be seen as depriving an ethnic group of 
something that it was constitutionally guaranteed. Finally, the top-down power 
iv 
structure created by the policy made the Soviet Union the only arbitrator of conflicts 
and guarantor of autonomy. As such, when the Soviet Union collapsed and their 
continued autonomy was no longer guaranteed, some smaller ethnic groups in the 
region resorted to armed conflict in order to ensure that their autonomy would be 
respected. 
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Glossary of Abbreviations 
 
AO: Autonomous Oblast 
ASSR: Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (autonomous republic) 
CCCP: Central Committee of the Communist Party (Central Committee) 
CIS: Commonwealth of Independent States 
CPSU: Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
DRG: Democratic Republic of Georgia 
Narkompros: People’s Commissariat for Education 
RSFSR: Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (Russian SFSR) 
SSR: Soviet Socialist Republic (union republic) 
TSFSR: Transcaucasian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (Transcaucasian SFSR) 
USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Soviet Union) 
 
Note: Many of the place-names used in this thesis are transliterated from languages 
that do not use the Latin alphabet, such as Russian, Georgian, and Armenian. As such, 
numerous possible spellings exist for each of these places. Any Russian words and place-
names will be transliterated using the USG official transliteration system.1 For all non-
Russian words and place-names, I have opted to use the most commonly seen English 
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spelling (e.g. Azerbaijan, Tbilisi, Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia). If a source referenced in 
this thesis uses a different transliteration for the name of a place or individual, the 





Following the implosion of the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union took control of a vast 
swath of territory, within which lived dozens of different ethnic groups. After defeating 
the remnants of the previous regime in the Russian Civil War, the Bolsheviks went on to 
retake some of the former territories of the Russian Empire that had since declared 
independence, and with the reconquest of these territories, the Bolsheviks incorporated 
dozens more ethnic groups into the fold. The fledgling Soviet Union was now faced with 
a crucially important task: it had to come up with a system of policies that would ensure 
the protection of ethnic minorities against the “chauvinism” of larger or better-
developed ethnic groups, ensure the preservation and development of all of its 
languages and cultures, prevent conflicts, and encourage cooperation. The end goal of 
this set of policies was the introduction of socialism and the replacement of narrowly-
focused nationalism with a spirit of cooperation and internationalism. As such, Soviet 
authorities quickly set about creating a truly unique and complex set of policies, which 
was specifically designed to answer this question. While this innovative policy, hereafter 
referred to as “the Soviet nationality policy,” seemed to speed the cultural development 
of several ethnic groups, prevented internal ethnic conflicts from escalating to armed 
hostilities, and limited cultural assimilation, its effectiveness vanished along with the 
Soviet Union in 1991, and several regions rapidly fell into conflict.  
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In the 1990s and early 200s, perhaps the most conflict-ridden region of the 
former Soviet Union was the South Caucasus – Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan – 
where conflicts raged in Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Adjara. All of 
these conflicts, save for the one in Adjara, have devolved into “frozen conflicts” and 
have not yet been resolved. While much has been written on the South Caucasus and on 
the Soviet nationality policy, there is still a gap between the two in discussions of the 
ethnic conflicts in this region. When present-day ethnic conflicts are discussed, they are 
often addressed as part of a broader history of the region, as in Thomas de Waal’s The 
Caucasus and Black Garden, or examined along with other post-Soviet ethnic conflicts as 
part of a more general look at the experiences of ethnic minorities in the Soviet Union, 
as in Jeremy Smith’s Red Nations. Literature on the Soviet nationality policy tends to 
focus on its creation, development, and implementation, as is the case with Francine 
Hirsch’s Empire of Nations, Ronald Suny’s The Soviet Experiment, and Yuri Slezkine’s 
“The USSR as a Communal Apartment,” or on a certain aspect of the policy, such as 
affirmative action and language policy in Terry Martin’s The Affirmative Action Empire. 
This thesis seeks to bridge the gap between the Soviet nationality policy and the ethnic 
conflicts in the South Caucasus by examining the following effects of the nationality 
policy. 
First, the policy created new power differentials between ethnic groups which 
had been on a more or less equal footing under Imperial Russian rule. Second, the policy 
divided ethnic groups across multiple territories, reducing the political power of the 
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divided groups and thus hindering their ability to advocate for themselves. Third, the 
territorial holdings and autonomy level of every ethnic group were set out in the Soviet 
constitution. As such, any decision to alter the status quo could be viewed as depriving 
one ethnic group of something that it had been constitutionally guaranteed. Moreover, 
due to the strict hierarchy created by the policy, changes to the status quo could be 
seen as favoring a less-developed ethnic group over a better-developed one (if the 
decision was in favor of the smaller ethnic group) or as perpetuating ethnic chauvinism 
and imperialist oppression (if the decision favored the larger group). Finally, the policy 
created a strictly hierarchical system of governance that was ruled from the top down. 
While the Soviet Union still existed, this hierarchy prevented conflicts from being 
resolved without the intervention of a high-level mediator. As a result, the central 
government was often the only guarantor of autonomy for ethnic groups located lower 
in the hierarchy, and when the Soviet Union collapsed, there was no one left to ensure 
that the rights of these groups would be respected. Therefore, smaller ethnic groups like 
the Karabakh Armenians, South Ossetians, and Abkhaz found themselves in newly 
independent states to which they had no ethnolinguistic ties, with their prospects for 
autonomy uncertain at best, and with no central arbitrator to resolve the dispute, 
making armed conflict seem like the only hope for a favorable resolution. 
Chapter 1 will examine the creation and initial implementation of the Soviet 
nationality policy, as well as the reasoning behind this policy. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 will 
use the regions of Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia as case studies, 
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examining each of these conflicts in order to show how they were worsened by the 
Soviet nationality policy. The chapter on Nagorno-Karabakh will have a special focus on 
the difficulties of resolving conflict between two union republics, as opposed to a union 
republic and a lower-level autonomous territory. The discussions of South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia will examine how the top-down power structure could allow a union republic 
to impose its will on its minority groups. The chapter on Abkhazia will also examine how 
the Soviet nationality policy could have even more of an impact on ethnic groups that 
did not have a strong presence outside of their territory. Finally, the conflict in Adjara 
will be used as a contrasting case study, examining why it was successfully resolved 
without ever escalating to armed warfare. The concluding chapter will examine the 
status of the three unresolved conflicts today, assess the odds of resolving these 
conflicts, and discuss the factors that help or hinder resolution of these conflicts. 
5 
 
Chapter One: Origins and Implementation of the Soviet Nationality Policy 
 
From the moment the Russian Civil War ended and the Soviet Union was formed in 
1922, the newly-created Soviet Union controlled an enormous stretch of the territory of 
the former Russian Empire, in which dwelt scores of different ethnic groups. Still more 
land and peoples fell under Soviet control during the Second World War and in its 
immediate aftermath. In order to maintain control of its territories, the Soviet Union 
had to find a way to keep these diverse ethnic groups subordinated to centralized 
power. However, so as not to follow the model of the imperial and colonialist powers it 
condemned, it also claimed to be seriously interested in protecting the rights of each of 
these groups. As such, Soviet ethnographers and top politicians almost immediately set 
about implementing a policy for governing the country’s many ethnic groups, which 
they had begun formulating even before the Russian Revolution as an alternative to 
existing Imperial Russian policy.  
Beginning in the 1700s and ending with the annexation of Kars and Batumi in 
1878, the Russian Empire began to incorporate the South Caucasus into the Russian 
Empire.1 As new areas were conquered or annexed, they were divided into several 
administrative units, which only loosely corresponded to ethnic boundaries. These 
administrative units were governed by Russian officials and subject to the same laws 
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 Arsène Saparov, From Conflict to Autonomy in the Caucasus: The Soviet Union and the Making of 
Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh (New York: Routledge, 2015), 34. 
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and imperial decrees as the rest of the Russian Empire, without any differences in 
autonomy for the various ethnic groups living in the conquered territories. At the time 
of the Russian Revolution, modern Georgia was divided between the Tbilisi and Kutaisi 
Governorates, Batumi Oblast (which roughly corresponded to modern Adjara), and 
Sukhumi Okrug (which is now Abkhazia).2 The Yerevan Governorate and Kars Oblast 
were inhabited mainly by Armenians; modern Armenia was largely contained within the 
former, while the latter was ceded to Turkey as part of the Treaty of Kars.3 4  Finally, 
modern Azerbaijan was divided between the Elizavetpol and Baku Governorates and the 
Zaqatala Okrug.5 When the Russian Empire collapsed in 1917, Georgia, Armenia, and 
Azerbaijan all declared independence. However, this independence was largely by 
default, as no government controlled the South Caucasus at that point, and the short-
lived Transcaucasian Commissariat was temporary by design, intending to govern only 
until a new constitutional assembly convened in Russia.6  
Shortly thereafter, in April 1918, the Transcaucasian parliament in Tbilisi 
announced the formation of the Transcaucasian Federation and its separation from 
Russia, but this new state was riven by internal conflicts between Georgia, Armenia, and 
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 “Договор о дружбе между АССР, ССРА и ССРГ с одной стороны и Турцией с другой, заключенный 
при участии РСФСР в Карсе (Карский договор), Статья 5,” Khronos, accessed April 29, 2016, 
http://hrono.ru/dokum/192_dok/19211013kars.php. 
5
 Saparov, From Conflict to Autonomy in the Caucasus, 37. 
6
 Thomas de Waal, The Caucasus: An Introduction (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 61. 
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Azerbaijan, and lasted only a month.7 Backed by Germany and the Ottoman Empire and 
led by the Georgian Mensheviks, Georgia seceded from the Transcaucasian Federation 
and proclaimed the independence of the Democratic Republic of Georgia on May 26, 
1918.8 Azerbaijan, led by the Musavat Party, also declared independence on May 28.9 
Armenia was the last to secede; led by the Dashnak movement, the First Armenian 
Republic was proclaimed on May 30.10 This was the first time in history at which the 
Georgians, Armenians, and Azeris had all controlled separate states named for their 
respective majority ethnic groups. These ethnic groups almost immediately set about 
asserting their control over ethnic minorities within their territories and disputing the 
borders of the new states.11 The Georgian Mensheviks waged military campaigns to 
bring South Ossetia and Abkhazia under Georgian control and instituted Georgian-
language instruction in Adjarian schools, and engaged in armed conflict with Armenia 
over the border regions of Lori and Borchalo; meanwhile, the Armenian general 
Andranik Toros Ozanian expelled tens of thousands of Azeris from Armenian-held 
Zangezur.12 These disputes would soon be overshadowed by the Bolshevik takeover, 
though. Spurred by Joseph Stalin, Sergo Ordzhonikidze, and Anastas Mikoyan, the Soviet 
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 Revaz Gachechiladze, “Geopolitics and foreign powers in the modern history of Georgia: Comparing 
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2007), 151. 
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 Ibid., 65-66. 
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reconquest of the South Caucasus began in April 1920 with the invasion of Azerbaijan, 
and ended with the fall of Batumi and the flight of the Georgian Mensheviks in March of 
the following year, aided by the pro-Bolshevik South Ossetians and Abkhaz.13 The South 
Caucasus was officially part of the Soviet Union – now, the Bolsheviks had to create a 
policy that would guarantee the rights of all the ethnic groups in the South Caucasus 
and keep ethnic conflicts in check. 
The Bolsheviks felt that it was important to distinguish between ethnic groups 
for three main reasons. First, in Vladimir Lenin’s interpretation of the Marxist theory of 
historical determinism, the development of national movements and the establishment 
of nation-states were universal characteristics of early capitalism, and mature capitalism 
progressing towards socialism would be marked by interaction between nations to the 
point that national boundaries began to fade away.14 Second, according to Lenin, it 
would be easiest and most effective to inculcate the people of the Soviet Union with 
socialist, anti-bourgeois, and anti-nationalist ideals if the people were taught in their 
native languages.15 As such, every ethnic group and every language had to be identified 
to ensure that every last citizen could be taught in their native tongue. Finally, in dealing 
with ethnic groups that already had national movements, it was important to distinguish 
between “oppressor-nation nationalism” and “oppressed-nation nationalism.” 
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 Ibid., 67-70. 
14
 Joseph Stalin, The Foundations of Leninism (New York: Prism Key Press, 2012), 72. 
15
 Yuri Slezkine, “The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic 
Particularism,” Slavic Review 53:2 (Summer 1994): 417-418. 
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The idea that some nationalist movements should be supported and other 
should not was articulated by Lenin as early as July 1916, but it was Joseph Stalin who 
fully fleshed out the idea.16 Stalin asserted that national movements which were not 
directed primarily or solely against absolutism, and thus not part of the international 
proletarian revolution, should not be supported, giving the Polish and Hungarian 
national movements of the 1840s as examples of national movements that did deserve 
the support of the proletariat, but stating that the Czech and South Slavic national 
movements that flared up at the same time should not be supported due to their 
reactionary nature.17 Moreover, ethnic groups that displayed what Soviet authorities 
called “oppressor-nation nationalism” or “great-power chauvinism” were to be 
overthrown by the proletariat revolution and subsequently subjected to self-discipline 
and ideological retraining.18 In the South Caucasus, this ideology was manifested by the 
Red Army’s invasion of newly-independent Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan and the 
subsequent appointment of Bolshevik leaders in these territories. On the other hand, 
Lenin and Stalin believed that it was important to recognize less-developed groups as 
distinct and preserve their language in order to assuage what they termed “oppressed-
nation nationalism,” since national movements among “oppressed” peoples were part 
of the “stubborn, continuous, and determined struggle against the dominant-nation 
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 Stalin, The Foundations of Leninism, 68. 
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 Ibid., 68. 
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 Slezkine, “The USSR as a Communal Apartment,” 419. 
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chauvinism of the ‘Socialists’ of the ruling nations.”19 20 However, before the national 
movements in the Soviet Union could be categorized and the socialist education of the 
peoples of the Soviet Union could begin, the Bolsheviks had to determine what 
constituted a distinct ethnic group in the first place.  
 The future leaders of the Soviet Union had set about finding an answer to this 
question even before the Russian Revolution had taken place. In 1913, in “Marxism and 
the National Question,” Joseph Stalin defined an ethnic group as being “a historically 
evolved, stable community based on a common language, territory, economic life and 
psychological make-up manifested in a community of culture.” This was a standard 
definition of the term at the time, and the definition the Soviet Union had in mind when 
formulating and implementing the nationality policy.21 (Note: Because this is the 
definition that Soviet authorities used to decide what did or did not constitute a distinct 
ethnic group, all uses of the term “ethnic group” in this thesis will refer to this definition 
of the term unless stated otherwise.) However, according to Marxist theory, only those 
ethnic groups that had reached a certain point in their economic development could be 
considered “nations,” and very few of the ethnic groups in the Soviet Union met this 
qualification.22 
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 Stalin, The Foundations of Leninism, 72-73. 
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 Slezkine, “The USSR as a Communal Apartment,” 415-416. 
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 Ibid., 420. 
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The Georgians, Armenians, and Azeris were considered “nations,” as all three 
had well-developed national movements and had declared their own independent 
states in 1918.23 However, the Azeri national movement was not quite as well-
developed as the other two, and as a result, the Azeris were not initially seen as a 
distinct ethnic group. They appear to have been consolidated into the Turks on the list 
of nationalities for the 1920 census, and did not appear as a distinct ethnic group on 
census forms until 1926.24 Like the Georgians and Armenians, most of the minority 
ethnic groups in the South Caucasus were recognized in the 1920 census. These groups 
included the Talysh and Lezgins of Azerbaijan and several ethnic groups in Georgia, 
among them the Ossetians, Abkhaz, Imeretians, Mingrelians, Gurians, and Svan, though 
the Adjarians were not listed.25 All of these ethnic groups were also listed in the 1926 
census, with the addition of the Adjarians and the Laz (another small ethnic group living 
in Georgia).26 However, the only ethnic groups in Georgia that were listed on the 1939 
census were the Georgians, Ossetians, and Abkhaz, with the rest consolidated into 
“Georgians” once again.27 These distinctions were critical in the implementation of the 
nationality policy. With few exceptions, ethnic groups that were not considered distinct 
as of the 1939 census were not granted autonomy, and only those that were considered 
“nations” would be given their own union republic. 
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 Francine Hirsch, Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making of the Soviet Union 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), 66. 
24
 Ibid., 327-333. 
25
 Ibid., 327 and 328. 
26
 Ibid., 329-333. 
27
 Ibid., 333-334. 
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One of the key goals of the Soviet nationality policy was to hasten the 
development of all of the ethnic groups in the Soviet Union through nationalism and 
into socialism. However, there were vast disparities in the development levels of the 
various ethnic groups in the Soviet Union, which dictated that some groups receive 
more autonomy than others. Those that were less developed, and thus received less 
autonomy, were subordinated to better-developed groups that could guide them 
towards socialism and help them catch up in terms of development. This concept was 
most clearly articulated by M.B. Mitin, M.D. Kammari, and G.F. Aleksandrov in “The 
Contribution of J.V. Stalin to Marxism-Leninism,” which was published in 1950 in honor 
of Stalin’s 70th birthday. In this text, Kammari asserts that the nationality policy 
represented a further development “of Lenin’s statement on the possibility of the 
transition of backward countries to socialism, skipping capitalism under the conditions 
of the support from proletarian revolutions in the developed countries.”28 Kammari 
then quotes Stalin, saying that “the actual (and not merely juridical) equalisation of 
nations (help and co-operation for the backward nations in raising themselves to the 
cultural and economic level of the more advanced nations) [is] one of the conditions 
necessary for securing fraternal co-operation between the labouring masses of the 
various nations.”29 Finally, Kammari explains that the Soviet nationality policy is distinct 
from imperialism because, where the Soviet policy encourages every ethnic group to 
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 M.B. Mitin, M.D. Kammari, and G.F. Aleksandrov, “The Contribution of J.V. Stalin to Marxism-Leninism,” 





develop and maintain a unique culture that is “nationalist in form, but socialist in 
content,” traditional imperialist nations simply swallow up other cultures and force 
them to assimilate to the culture of the ruling power.30 In short, the Soviet nationality 
policy required that nationalities be identified, delineated, and aided in creating a 
unique culture – a process referred to as korenizatsiya, or root-building – and that less-
developed nationalities be subordinated to better-developed ethnic groups in order to 
guide them along the path to socialism and, eventually, to Communism. While the 
concept of korenizatsiya did at least nominally prevent cultures from being completely 
assimilated, it also created strict delineations between ethnic groups that had co-existed 
without such demarcations for centuries.  
Once these ethnic groups were defined, the concept of equalization of nations 
caused some of these newly-defined ethnic groups to be placed under the 
administration of other groups which previously had not exerted any political control 
over them. According to Stalin, the various ethnic groups of the Soviet Union, especially 
the less-developed groups, could not be permitted to determine their own level of 
autonomy because, rather than granting ethnic groups real freedom and equality, the 
idea of national self-determination manipulated less-developed ethnic groups into 
allowing imperialist nations to rule them as colonies in exchange for allowing them 
cultural autonomy.31 Once the territorial boundaries and autonomy levels of all of the 




 Stalin, The Foundations of Leninism, 65-66. 
14 
 
ethnic groups had been determined, they could not be changed unless the central 
government thought it was appropriate to do so. In particular, smaller ethnic groups’ 
requests for increased autonomy or transfer to a different union republic were almost 
always ignored, since the ideology behind the nationality policy implied that any ethnic 
group that was subordinated to another had been put in that situation because it was 
sufficiently under-developed as to require the guidance of a higher authority.32 
However, the central government did make some adjustments to the autonomy levels 
of certain ethnic groups before the ethnoterritorial structure of the Soviet Union was 
finalized, not all of which were based on official Bolshevik ideology. 
After delineating the boundaries between different ethnic groups and 
determining their various levels of development, the Bolsheviks had to create a 
hierarchy of ethnoterritorial units and place each ethnic group within this hierarchy. At 
the top of this hierarchy were the fifteen union republics, each headed by a so-called 
“titular nationality” whose name the republic bore.33 Initially, Georgia, Armenia, and 
Azerbaijan together constituted a single union republic, which was called the 
Transcaucasian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (TSFSR). Despite the dissolution of 
the independent Transcaucasian Federation in 1918 due to internal tensions, Stalin and 
Ordzhonikidze favored a federation in order to curb Georgian nationalism. Both 
considered the Georgian nationalist movement the primary impediment to maintaining 
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 Jeremy Smith, “Stalin as Commissar for Nationality Affairs, 1918-1922,” in Stalin: A New History (New 
York: Cambridge University Press,2005), ed. Sarah Davies and James Harris, 47. 
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 Hirsch, Empire of Nations, 97. 
15 
 
peace and Soviet hegemony in the region, as Stalin believed that the Georgian 
treatment of Abkhazia and South Ossetia was marked by great-power chauvinism and 
exploitation.34 For the same reason, Abkhazia was originally a union republic on par with 
the TSFSR, though it was associated with Georgia by treaty.35 With the drafting of the 
Soviet Constitution of 1936, however, Abkhazia was downgraded to an autonomous 
republic within Georgia, and the TSFSR was dissolved, making Georgia, Armenia, and 
Azerbaijan separate union republics, or SSRs.36 37 Status as a union republic was, in the 
end, largely determined by the concept of “cultural backwardness.” When the People’s 
Commissariat for Education compiled its official list of “culturally backward” 
nationalities in 1932, the Georgians and Armenians were declared “cultured” 
nationalities, whereas the Azeris and all of the South Caucasian ethnic groups that did 
not have a union republic were listed as “culturally backward.”38 In addition, while the 
Azeris were listed as backward, they were more or less on par with Kazakhstan and 
Uzbekistan, both of which also had their own union republics despite being considered 
“culturally backward,” in terms of literacy, economic development, and use of the local 
language in local government.39 
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 Terry Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), 7-8. 
35
 de Waal, The Caucasus, 74. 
36
 “Конституция Союза Советских Социалистических Республик 1936-ого года, Глава II, Статья 25,” 
Garant, accessed May 1, 2016, http://constitution.garant.ru/history/ussr-rsfsr/1936/red_1936/3958676/. 
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 “Конституция СССР 1936-ого года, Глава II, Статья 13.” 
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 Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire, 166. 
39
 Ibid., 134. 
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Just below the union republics were the autonomous national republics, or 
ASSRs. These included the Adjara region of coastal Georgia, the Nakhchivan exclave of 
Azerbaijan, the Crimean Peninsula (initially under Russian control, later transferred to 
the Ukrainian SSR), and numerous territorial units located within the Russian Soviet 
Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR), particularly in the North Caucasus, the Volga River 
basin, the Russian Far North, and eastern Siberia. The ASSRs enjoyed a great deal of 
political autonomy, but were still subordinate to the union republic in which they were 
located.40 Abkhazia was an unusual case, as it had been a union republic associated with 
the TSFSR from 1922 to 1931, at which point it was downgraded to an ASSR controlled 
by the Georgian SSR; its status as such was finalized by the Soviet Constitution of 1936.41 
42 The subordination of the Abkhaz to the Georgians appears nonsensical at first glance, 
since all of the close ethnolinguistic relatives of the Abkhaz were placed under the 
control of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist republic (RSFSR).43 Closer examination 
reveals a much more pragmatic reason for placing the Abkhaz under the jurisdiction of 
the TSFSR and later the Georgian SSR, though. Since the Abkhaz were relatively well-
developed and had aided the Bolsheviks in the Red Army takeover of the independent 
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Democratic Republic of Georgia, the more Bolshevik-friendly Abkhaz could act as an 
internal counterweight to the Georgians within the government of the Georgian SSR. 44 
In general, only ethnic groups that were considered distinct from the titular 
nationality of the union republic in which they resided could receive any level of 
autonomy. However, the Adjara and Nakhchivan ASSRs were both exceptions to the 
rule. The Adjarians had been consolidated into the Georgian ethnic group on the list of 
nationalities for the 1939 census, but despite the relatively minor cultural distinctions, 
they retained a designated territory under their control and a certain degree of 
autonomy, both of which were required under Article VI of the 1923 Treaty of Kars.45 46 
Similarly, Article V of the same treaty stipulated that the Nakhchivan exclave would be 
an autonomous territory within Azerbaijan, even though its inhabitants were 
predominantly Azeri and therefore part of the same ethnic group as the majority of the 
residents of the union republic to which they belonged.47 
Lower still in the power structure were the autonomous oblasts, or AOs, which 
included the Jewish Autonomous Oblast in the far east of the RSFSR, South Ossetia, and 
Nagorno-Karabakh. While both ASSRs and AOs were under the direct control of the 
union republic in which they were located, AOs had less political autonomy.48 Both of 
the ethnic groups that were granted autonomy in the South Caucasus were spread 
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across two union republics – the Armenians, who constituted the majority of the 
population of Nagorno-Karabakh had their own autonomous republic, while the 
Ossetians were split between the TSFSR (specifically Georgia) and the Russian SFSR. 
Control of Nagorno-Karabakh, a majority-Armenian territory surrounded by 
majority-Azeri territory, was hotly contested between the Armenian and Azerbaijani 
SSRs. The Soviet authorities declared the territory part of the Azerbaijani SSR in 1923, as 
placating the then-weak Armenian SSR was considered less of a priority than ensuring 
that the Azerbaijani SSR was a single territorial and economic unit, which would allow 
local herdsmen to move their livestock between the highlands of Nagorno-Karabakh and 
the surrounding lowlands without crossing between SSRs.49 As a concession to Armenia 
for not receiving control of Nagorno-Karabakh, the region was granted the status of an 
AO, and its borders were drawn so that 94 percent of its population was ethnically 
Armenian.50 
As mentioned above, the Democratic Republic of Georgia had asserted control of 
South Ossetia, but not North Ossetia, during its short independence; as such, Georgia 
(under the auspices of the TSFSR) retained control of South Ossetia.51 Anastas Mikoyan 
proposed uniting North Ossetia (then an AO within the RSFSR) and South Ossetia as an 
ASSR within Georgia in 1925. However, his suggestion was shot down by Stalin, who 
believed that uniting Ossetia within Georgia would cause Chechnya, Dagestan, and 
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Ingushetia to attempt to join the TSFSR, which would in turn spark an independence 
movement among the Don, Kuban, and Terek Cossacks and would thus inflame Russian 
nationalism.52 Moreover, like Abkhazia, South Ossetia had been strongly pro-Bolshevik 
during the Soviet conquest of the South Caucasus, staging three uprisings against 
Georgia with Bolshevik assistance. It also commanded a strategic location, straddling the 
Georgian Military Highway and commanding the critically important pass through the 
Daryal Gorge on the Russia-Georgia border.53 Placing South Ossetia within the Georgian 
SSR, but granting it a certain degree of autonomy, would ensure that the Ossetians 
remained friendly to the Bolsheviks, and therefore helped to guarantee that the central 
government would be able to use the Georgian Military Highway to intervene if Georgia 
attempted to re-assert its independence. 
Of all the types of ethno-territorial unit, autonomous okrugs, all of which were 
located in the far north of the Russian SFSR, had the least autonomy. Until 1990, all ten 
autonomous okrugs were directly administrated by an oblast or krai (neither of which 
were designated for specific ethnicities, and were usually inhabited mainly by the titular 
nationality of their union republic) rather than being on par with an oblast or krai as the 
AOs were.54 After the revision of the Russian constitution in 1990, autonomous okrugs 
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were no longer required to be subject to an oblast or krai.55 However, only three 
autonomous okrugs (Agin-Buryat, Komi-Permyak, and Chukotka) were ever subject only 
to the RSFSR or the Russian Federation, and three of the four remaining autonomous 
okrugs (Nenets, Yamal-Nenets, and Khanty-Mansi) are currently administered by an 
oblast (the former by Arkhangelsk Oblast, the latter two by Tyumen Oblast), with 
Chukotka as the lone exception. Since all of the autonomous okrugs in the Soviet Union 
were located in the Russian SFSR, as mentioned above, they will not be discussed any 
further in this thesis. 
The boundaries of the ethnoterritorial units in the South Caucasus were finalized 
by the 1936 Constitution of the USSR, and would remain intact until the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union. Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia were the only union republics in the 
South Caucasus; all were independent of each other, and answered only to the Supreme 
Soviet of the USSR.56 The Azeri SSR controlled Nakhchivan and Nagorno-Karabakh, which 
had the status of an ASSR and an AO respectively.57 The Georgian SSR was given control 
of the Abkhazian and Adjarian ASSRs, as well as the South Ossetian AO.58 The Armenian 
SSR, which was more ethnically homogeneous than the Georgian or Azeri SSRs, did not 
have any autonomous territories under its control.59 
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During the Soviet era, the nationality policy, combined with the presence of a 
strong central government to arbitrate disputes, prevented the outbreak of any armed 
conflict. However, the strict hierarchy of ethnic groups that the policy had created still 
allowed more powerful ethnic groups to oppress the groups that were subordinate to 
them, but prevented the subordinate groups from talking effective countermeasures 
against such oppression. As a result, tensions simmered throughout the Soviet era. Once 
the Soviet Union collapsed, the powerful central government that had arbitrated 
conflicts and guaranteed a certain degree of political and cultural autonomy to the 
smaller ethnic groups was gone, and so the smaller groups took up arms in the hopes 
that they could force the more powerful ethnic groups to respect their autonomy. These 
ethnic conflicts were most heavily concentrated in the South Caucasus (modern 
Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan), where disagreements over the status of Nagorno-
Karabakh, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Adjara would erupt after the Soviet Union 
dissolved. Chapters 2-4 will examine the conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, 
and Abkhazia – the three territories which remain embroiled in “frozen conflicts” to the 
present day. Chapter 5 will also act as a case study, assessing the conflict over Adjara 
and exploring the reasons why armed conflict did not take place and why the conflict 
was eventually resolved, in contrast to the other three conflicts in the region. 
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Chapter Two: Nagorno-Karabakh 
 
While one of the goals of the Soviet nationality policy was to prevent ethnic conflicts, in 
the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, the first of the four conflicts used as a case study for this 
thesis, the policy actually helped to engender conflict rather than prevent it. First, by 
declaring the Karabakh Armenians subordinate to the Azeris, it created a power 
differential between the two groups that had not existed previously. Second, it 
intentionally divided ethnic Armenians (who had one of the stronger nationalist 
movements within the Soviet Union) across territories in order to weaken their political 
power. Third, the fact that the status of Nagorno-Karabakh was  set out in the 
Constitution of the Soviet Union meant that any changes to the status quo would be 
perceived as depriving either the Azeris or the Armenians something they had been 
constitutionally guaranteed, and the two groups’ different economic and cultural status 
ensured that any changes would also be seen as favoritism towards one group or the 
other. Finally, the power structure it created allowed higher levels of government to 
force their decisions on lower levels while preventing local issues from being handled at 
the local level and made the central government of the Soviet Union the only real 
guarantor of Nagorno-Karabakh’s autonomous status. As such, tensions simmered 
under the surface until the collapse of the Soviet Union, and with no central authority to 
mediate the conflict and Nagorno-Karabakh’s autonomy in jeopardy, armed conflict 
seemed to be the only way to settle the question. 
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Nagorno-Karabakh is a small, mountainous region of southwestern Azerbaijan, 
located along Armenia’s southeastern border. It is part of the larger Karabakh region, 
located entirely within Azerbaijan, which comprises both the highlands of Nagorno-
Karabakh and the lowlands of the Karabakh Steppe.1 Nagorno-Karabakh itself is 
inhabited largely by ethnic Armenians, who outnumber Azeris in the territory by a wide 
margin.2 3 However, the majority of the population of lowland Karabakh is ethnically 
Azeri, to the point that the population of the Karabakh region as a whole is roughly half-
Armenian and half-Azeri, with a slight Azeri majority.4 Both Armenia and Azerbaijan lay 
claim to the Karabakh region by virtue of their historical presence in the area and 
cultural legacy. The Armenian claim dates back at least 1500 years, with the 
mountainous and remote highlands of Nagorno-Karabakh historically serving as a 
stronghold of Armenian culture and an area in which Armenian princes held local power 
when Armenia as a whole was subjected to foreign conquest and occupation.5 By the 
mid-1700s, however, some twenty-three khanates had been formed on the territory of 
modern-day Azerbaijan, with the Karabakh khanate being one of the oldest and largest, 
and it is on this cultural and historical basis that Azerbaijan claims the territory of 
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Nagorno-Karabakh.6 As such, the Karabakh region, particularly Nagorno-Karabakh, 
presented a complicated issue to those in charge of applying the Soviet Union’s 
nationality policy to the region.  
The first goal of the Soviet nationality policy in Nagorno-Karabakh was to simply 
define the various ethnic groups living in Azerbaijan. Once these ethnic groups had been 
defined, one of them had to be named the titular nationality. While the Azerbaijani SSR 
included Azeris, Russians, Armenians, Tatars, Talysh, and Lezgins, the Azeris constituted 
a majority of the population and were politically dominant in the territory, and were 
therefore declared its titular nationality. Finally, the Soviet authorities had to determine 
which of the minority ethnic groups in Azerbaijan were sufficiently populous, 
concentrated, and economically and politically developed to merit autonomous status. 
In light of the fact that the Karabakh Armenians were tightly concentrated and belonged 
to a nationality that was sufficiently well-developed to merit its own titular republic 
elsewhere, Nagorno-Karabakh was granted autonomy, but was only given the status of 
an AO. As such, despite its substantial Armenian majority, Nagorno-Karabakh had less 
political autonomy than the Adjara ASSR, whose dominant ethnic group (along with the 
Mingrelians, Svans, and Laz) had at one point been consolidated into the Georgian 
nationality on the basis of their shared language, culture, and history.7 Nagorno-
Karabakh was also therefore granted less autonomy than the Crimean ASSR, none of 
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whose resident nationalities had as dominant a majority as the Armenians in Nagorno-
Karabakh did. Most galling of all to the Karabakh Armenians was the fact that the Azeris 
of the Nakhchivan exclave were granted an ASSR within Azerbaijan, a provision which 
had been required by the Treaty of Kars, despite being part of the republic’s titular 
nationality and no more populous or concentrated than the Karabakh Armenians.8 
This political subordination to the Azerbaijani SSR created a power imbalance in 
favor of the Azeris that had not existed before, as Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia had 
together constituted the Transcaucasian SFSR from 1924 to 1936. 9 Even earlier, prior to 
the Russian Civil War, Nagorno-Karabakh had, in a sense, been part of Azerbaijan, as it 
was located within the Elizavetpol Governorate.10 However, under imperial rule, the 
Elizavetpol Governorate and all of the ethnic groups within that territory were directly 
governed by imperial officials, and as such, there were no real power differentials 
between the local ethnic groups. Additionally, within the union republics, the titular 
nationalities enjoyed an elevated level of privilege, including increased access to 
professional jobs and higher education, compared to smaller nationalities living in 
subordinate ethnoterritorial units.11 As a result, the Armenian population of Nagorno-
Karabakh was less privileged than both the Azeris who dominated the SSR in which they 
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dwelt and their fellow Armenians who lived across the border in the territory of the 
Armenian SSR. The Karabakh Armenians therefore felt that they had been denied rights 
that the Soviet Union had promised them – they had not been allowed national self-
determination, as they had not been allowed to decide which union republic they were 
placed in or given any effective means of contesting the decision after the fact. 
Moreover, they felt that they had been denied the privileges enjoyed by other members 
of their own ethnic group simply because they had been placed in a different union 
republic and made subordinate to another nationality against their will. 
This new social hierarchy further compounded the issues inherent with the 
different levels of political power held by various nationalities within the Azerbaijani 
SSR, as the leadership of the union republics was selected by the central government. In 
combination with the increased access to professional jobs and education, this selection 
system tended to mean that titular nationalities were over-represented in the 
governments of the union republics, whereas minorities such as the Karabakh 
Armenians were under-represented, which helped to fuel the resentment of the 
Armenian minority in the Azerbaijani SSR towards its Azeri majority.12 As with the 
political power imbalance, this social hierarchy had not existed before due to the 
imperial and early Soviet administration of the South Caucasus as a single territory.  
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On the other hand, the Azeris felt that the Karabakh Armenians had been 
unfairly elevated to a position of privilege above them. In 1932, the People’s 
Commissariat for Education had declared the Armenians a “cultured” nationality. 
However, the Azeris were listed among the “culturally backward” nationalities due to 
their lower literacy rates, stronger tribal ties, and less-developed national identity.13 As 
a result, while Karabakh Armenians could be placed in high-level roles within the 
administration of the Azerbaijani SSR, Azeris could not achieve the same success or 
wield the same level of political power in the Armenian SSR.14 Both groups therefore felt 
that they had lost social or political clout based on their status as culturally developed or 
backwards and their placement within the hierarchy of ethnoterritorial units. However, 
the loss of political power was even more upsetting to the Armenian SSR and the 
Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh in light of other territorial and political 
changes made by the Soviet Union at roughly the same time. 
In the years between the establishment of the Soviet Union and the outbreak of 
the Second World War, both the Armenian and Azerbaijani SSRs were subjected to a 
series of territorial and political changes that were imposed by the central government 
and created lasting resentment between the two SSRs. Due to the belief among Soviet 
authorities that it was more important to ensure that the Azerbaijani SSR was a single 
territorial unit, which would help it to catch up to its neighbors in terms of economic 
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and political development, than to appease the weaker Armenian SSR, the desires of the 
Karabakh Armenian population were not taken into consideration when the borders 
between the union republics were established.15 Moreover, because the Soviet 
constitutions stipulated that changing the boundaries of a union republic required the 
consent of that republic, future demands for a change in the status of the Karabakh 
Armenians as an ethnic minority would likewise be ignored.16 17 Both the Armenian 
population of Nagorno-Karabakh and the equally-substantial Azeri population of 
Armenia were placed in union republics other than the republic in which they were a 
titular nationality and ended up with a reduced level of autonomy as a result, though 
the Karabakh Armenians were not the only Azerbaijani ethnic group to be divided across 
multiple territorial units. 
Two other minority ethnic groups in the Azerbaijani SSR were considered trans-
territorial nationalities, or ethnic groups living in multiple states. To the north, the 
Lezgin population was divided between the Dagestan ASSR (part of the Russian SFSR) 
and the Azerbaijani SSR. Those within the Azerbaijani SSR had fewer rights as a minority 
group within that territory than those in Dagestan enjoyed as one of the autonomous 
                                                          
15
 Ibid., 105. 
16
 “Конституция Союза Советских Социалистических Республик 1936-ого года, Глава II, Статья 18,” 
Garant, accessed May 3, 2016, http://constitution.garant.ru/history/ussr-rsfsr/1936/red_1936/3958676/. 
17
 “Конституция Союза Советских Социалистических Республик 1977-ого года, § III, Глава 9, Статья 




republic’s multiple constituent nationalities.18 Similarly, the Talysh ethnic group was 
divided between the southern part of the Azerbaijani SSR and northeastern Iran, which 
hindered its ability to assert its status and rights as a distinct nationality.19 Both of these 
cases mirror those of the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh in that their 
distribution across multiple ethnoterritorial units had a negative impact on their rights 
as ethnic minorities in the Azerbaijani SSR. The territorial changes that caused this 
division began almost immediately after the founding of the Soviet Union. Imposed by 
the Soviet government, not only did these changes divide the Armenians and Azeris 
across both SSRs, they were perceived by both SSRs as favoring the other. 
The first of these impositions was the Treaty of Kars, which put an end to 
lingering conflict in the region after the end of the First World War and the collapse of 
the Ottoman and Russian Empires. Written in 1921 and signed in 1922 by 
representatives of the Soviet Union and the Turkish provisional government, the treaty 
included numerous cessions of territory. First, the port city of Batumi and the 
surrounding region of Adjara, which had been the northern half of the Kars Oblast of the 
Russian Empire, were ceded to the Georgian SSR on the condition that Turkey would 
have guaranteed access to the port and would not be required to pay import or export 
duties there. Second, the territory of Nakhchivan was declared an autonomous territory 
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under the control of the Azerbaijani SSR, with Turkey acting as a guarantor of its 
status.20 However, the Armenian SSR also had claims on the territory of Nakhchivan, 
none of which were granted in the treaty.21 These claims, as well as the claims of the 
Armenian SSR to Nagorno-Karabakh, were based on the fact that the Bolsheviks had 
promised both territories to Armenia in 1920, a promise which the Treaty of Kars did not 
acknowledge.22 The most irksome provision of the treaty in the eyes of the Armenian 
SSR was the cession of the southern half of the former Kars Oblast to Turkey. This 
territory had been part of northwestern Armenia and included two culturally and 
historically important sites: Mount Ararat, which was displayed in the emblem of the 
Armenian SSR and later the Armenian coat of arms, and the ruins of the ancient 
Armenian capital of Ani.23 These stipulations of the treaty were provocative partly 
because the Armenian SSR was the only signatory of the treaty that lost territory rather 
than gained it, and partly because some of its most culturally important lands were 
ceded to a country which had been openly hostile to Armenia in recent years. 
The Azerbaijani SSR had grievances of its own against the Armenian SSR 
stemming from political changes imposed by the Soviet government. In July of 1923, the 
Soviet government issued a decree establishing Nagorno-Karabakh as an autonomous 
oblast within Azerbaijan. However, the equally sizable and concentrated Azeri 
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population in Armenia was not granted its own autonomous ethnoterritorial unit, a 
discrepancy that did not go unnoticed by the Azeri SSR. The issue was worsened by the 
fact that the Azeri population in Armenia, which had been 575,000 strong in 1918, 
decreased every year.24 As such, the government of the Azerbaijani SSR believed that it 
was being forced to accommodate the demands of its Armenian minority, while the 
Armenian SSR was not required to make any such concessions to its Azeri minority in 
turn. 
Further decisions and decrees on the status of various Armenian and Azeri 
territories came down from on high following the Treaty of Kars and the decree on the 
establishment of Nagorno-Karabakh. The Constitution of the USSR of 1936 stipulated 
the status of Nagorno-Karabakh as an autonomous oblast within the Azerbaijani SSR.25 
This was in keeping with the precedent set by the 1923 treaty establishing Nagorno-
Karabakh and its status. There was also a slightly earlier precedent to be found in the 
1922 constitution of the soon-to-be dissolved Transcaucasian Soviet Federative Socialist 
Republic.26 This constitution declared that the status of autonomous republics and 
oblasts within the three federative republics of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan was 
unchangeable, which effectively eliminated the chance of Nagorno-Karabakh gaining 
any increased level of autonomy.  In addition to the stipulation of the 1936 Constitution 
of the USSR that Nagorno-Karabakh would remain an autonomous territory within the 
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Azerbaijani SSR, the borders between the Armenian and Azerbaijani SSRs were redrawn 
slightly in the early 1930s. This redrawing moved the Armenian border slightly to the 
west and granted a small strip of territory called the Lachin Corridor to the Azerbaijani 
SSR, an addition which meant that Nagorno-Karabakh was now fully enclosed within the 
Azerbaijani SSR and no longer bordered the Armenian SSR.27 
During and after the Second World War, the borders of the ethnoterritorial units 
of the Caucasus were once again redrawn, prompted by the internal deportations of 
several Caucasian nationalities.28 In the midst of this reestablishment of the internal 
borders of the Soviet Union, the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of Armenia submitted a request in November 1945 that the Soviet 
government reconsider the status of Nagorno-Karabakh as subordinate to the 
Azerbaijani SSR. However, discussion of the matter halted abruptly when the First 
Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan demanded 
that, in exchange for the cession of Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia, Armenia would have 
to cede three of its territories that bordered Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan.29  
This failure of negotiations illustrates that no decision could be made that one 
party would not view as favoring the other: the Armenian SSR would not accept 
anything other than the unconditional cession of Nagorno-Karabakh, while the 
Azerbaijani SSR demanded that it receive some territory from the Armenian SSR as 
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compensation for its loss of Nagorno-Karabakh. This perception that one SSR was 
favored over the other is reinforced by the fact that Armenian suspicions of favoritism 
towards the Azerbaijani SSR may not have been without justification. Baku, the capital 
of the Azerbaijani SSR, was a center of oil production and one of the main shipping hubs 
on the Caspian Sea, which made it the most economically valuable city in the South 
Caucasus for the Soviet Union and foreign powers, whereas the land-locked Armenian 
SSR had little mineral wealth by comparison and did not control any major shipping 
routes.30 As such, it was in the best economic interests of the Soviet Union to favor the 
Azerbaijani SSR over the Armenian SSR in territorial disputes between the two. Whether 
real or imagined, this perception of favoritism prevented the two sides from coming to a 
mutual agreement on the status of Nagorno-Karabakh and added additional fuel to the 
tensions growing between them. 
Between the end of the Second World War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
the repeated failure of previous attempts to change the status quo discouraged any 
further attempts to grant Nagorno-Karabakh greater autonomy or transfer control of 
the territory to the Armenian SSR. In fact, the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh was officially 
addressed only three times in this period. First, in 1966, the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union created and assigned a task to write a report on 
the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, which was to be presented to the CCCPs of the 
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Azerbaijani and Armenian ASSRs, but this never came to fruition.31 Second, the 1977 
iteration of the Constitution of the USSR upheld the precedent set by the 1936 
constitution and 1923 decree on Nagorno-Karabakh, stipulating that the region would 
remain an autonomous oblast under the jurisdiction of the Azerbaijani SSR.32 Lastly, in 
June of 1981, the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijani SSR adopted a new law, “On the 
Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast,” which likewise reaffirmed the status quo.33 
This status quo would remain largely unchallenged until the 1980s. Gorbachev’s 
policy of glasnost and his reforms towards democratization renewed the belief of the 
Karabakh Armenians that their territory might be granted increased autonomy or 
transferred to the control of the Armenian SSR, as they felt that the central government 
would be more willing to hear their grievances and allow them some freedom to decide 
their own status. Emboldened by the idea of glasnost, many began to publicly protest in 
favor of reunification with the Armenian SSR for the first time in decades.34 However, 
since the Armenian and Azerbaijani SSRs had grown increasingly unwilling to 
compromise following the repeated failed attempts to reach an agreement on the 
status of Nagorno-Karabakh, the central government of the Soviet Union had become 
the only authority that could arbitrate the conflict, and its power was rapidly 
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weakening.35 Tensions increased further in June of 1988, when the Supreme Soviet of 
the Armenian SSR consented to merge with Nagorno-Karabakh in response to a request 
by the government of the autonomous oblast. It then requested that the Supreme 
Soviet of the USSR consider the transfer of Nagorno-Karabakh to the Armenian SSR 
without consulting the Azerbaijani SSR, a violation of the provision of national 
sovereignty in the 1977 constitution. The Supreme Soviet of the USSR declared a few 
days after receiving this request that it would not transfer control of Nagorno-Karabakh 
without the consent of the Azerbaijani SSR, and by July, it was decided that no transfers 
of territory would occur.36 This abortive attempt at a transfer of territory further proved 
that the two hostile union republics would not be able to sort out the conflict on their 
own, but the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 left them with no choice but to fight it 
out. 
Almost immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, hostilities in Nagorno-
Karabakh erupted into full-scale conflict, as the Soviet government was no longer able 
to arbitrate the dispute, and Armenia and Azerbaijan had to decide the fate of Nagorno-
Karabakh themselves. Armenia initially had the advantage, as it had been making 
preparations for independence for three years, and was therefore much more prepared 
to deal with the power vacuum than Azerbaijan.37 Additionally, Azerbaijani actions in 
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict had largely been directed by Viktor Polyanichko, the 
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deputy of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, since January of 1990.38 After the failure 
of the August 1991 coup d’état attempt, however, Polyanichko was found to have been 
close to the plotters of the coup, and was forced to leave Azerbaijan as a result.39 This 
advantage proved to be of little consequence, though, as Armenia could not act 
decisively. First, Armenia did not want to be perceived as an aggressor against another 
newly independent state.40 Second, more Soviet military units had been located in 
Azerbaijan than in Armenia. As such, when Soviet military equipment was divided 
among the formerly-Soviet states, Armenia initially received less weaponry than 
Azerbaijan, and Armenian president Levon Ter-Petrosyan could only convince the 
Russian government enough military hardware to put Armenia on equal footing with 
Azerbaijan, effectively creating a military stalemate.41 
Only three months after Armenia and Azerbaijan declared their independence 
from the Soviet Union, the parliament of newly-independent Azerbaijan abolished the 
autonomy of Nagorno-Karabakh, sparking what would come to be known as the 
Nagorno-Karabakh War.42 Not even war, however, provided a conclusive decision on the 
fate of Nagorno-Karabakh; the conflict devolved into a stalemate, in which no 
agreement could be reached due to the perception of all the proposed solutions as 
excessively favoring one side of the conflict or the other. Control of the Lachin Corridor, 
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a thin strip of mainly Azeri-inhabited territory that separates Nagorno-Karabakh from 
Armenia, was and remains an especially thorny question. Azerbaijan argues that the 
Lachin Corridor is indisputably part of Azerbaijan, given its majority-Azeri population, 
whereas Armenia believes that Nagorno-Karabakh would be suffocated by Azerbaijan if 
the Lachin Corridor could not be used to send in Armenian and other foreign aid.43 
Nagorno-Karabakh remains an unrecognized state with de facto independence, but 
under the nominal control of Azerbaijan, to this day.44 
This history of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict demonstrates that the Soviet 
policy towards the constituent nationalities of the Soviet Union created and aggravated 
the conflict in four key ways. First, by granting increased rights and privileges to titular 
nationalities within their own SSRs, it created a power imbalance between ethnic 
minorities and majorities in the South Caucasus that had not previously existed there 
due to its earlier administration as a single territorial unit, without differentiation 
between the ethnic groups dwelling there. Second, the policy divided ethnic groups 
across the boundaries of ethnoterritorial units, partly due to the intermingling of ethnic 
groups along the Armenian-Azerbaijani border and partly because of the central 
government’s belief that the Azerbaijani SSR had to be consolidated as much as possible 
in order to help it catch up to its neighbors in terms of national development. This 
weakened the political clout of ethnic minorities and, in combination with the increased 
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privileges afforded to the titular nationalities, created an Armenian minority within the 
Azeri SSR that could see a clear difference between the treatment of Armenians in the 
Armenian SSR, that of Azeris within the Azerbaijani SSR, and its own treatment by the 
government of the Azerbaijani SSR. Third, economic concerns and the privilege afforded 
to titular nationalities caused the central government to make decisions that each side 
viewed as favoring the other, a perception that continued to prove problematic until the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. Finally, the hierarchy of power the Soviet Union created for 
its ethnoterritorial units meant that, due once again to the higher status of titular 
nationalities, the Karabakh Armenians could not obtain proportional representation in 
the government of the Azeri SSR. More importantly, though, it made the central 
government the only authority that could arbitrate disputes between SSRs and the only 
guarantor of Nagorno-Karabakh’s autonomy. As a result, when the Soviet Union 
collapsed, tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan had built up to the point that they 
were unable to come to an agreement, and with no  central authority to resolve the 
dispute and Nagorno-Karabakh in danger of losing its autonomy, armed conflict was the 
only remaining means of resolving the dispute. These factors in the conflict have caused 
long-standing resentment between Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh, and 
will need to be addressed if the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh is to end. 
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Chapter Three: South Ossetia 
 
The second case study will examine the conflict between Georgia and South Ossetia. 
Much like the Armenians in the Armenian SSR and Nagorno-Karabakh, the Ossetians 
found themselves divided between two union republics and subordinated to an ethnic 
group with which they had previously been on equal footing. While Ossetia had been 
divided for close to 150 years by the time the Red Army retook the Caucasus, the Soviet 
nationality policy created new problems by failing to unite North and South Ossetia 
despite espousing national self-determination, creating a power differential between 
the Ossetians and the Georgians, and prohibiting lower-level authorities from 
attempting to resolve the conflict. 
 Ossetia spans the central Caucasus Mountains, commanding a strategic location 
along the Georgian Military Highway.1 Its people, the Ossetians, speak an Iranian 
language unrelated to Russian or Georgian, and the geographic divide created by the 
Caucasus Mountains has led to the development of slightly different dialects in North 
and South Ossetia.2 The region has been both geographically and politically divided 
since 1774, when modern-day North Ossetia was conquered by the Russian Empire; 
South Ossetia was absorbed into the Russian Empire along with Georgia in 1801.3 North 
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Ossetia was made part of the Terek Oblast, while South Ossetia was placed in the 
Governorate of Tbilisi.4 As such, while the Ossetians were divided, they were on equal 
footing with neighboring ethnic groups, as all were directly governed by Imperial 
Russian authorities. 
 Tensions between the South Ossetians and the Georgians flared up seemingly 
overnight during the Russian Civil War, largely because the Ossetians would rather have 
been under the control of a Bolshevik-governed Russian state than Menshevik-led 
Georgia. South Ossetian Bolsheviks declared Ossetia loyal to Russia in May 1920, which 
prompted the Bolshevik Party’s commissar for foreign affairs, Giorgy Chicherin, to 
criticize the Georgian Mensheviks for attacking the Soviet Republic of South Ossetia, 
stating that “there is no South Ossetia within Georgia.”5 In response, Valiko Jugeli, 
commander of the Georgian Menshevik People’s Guard, attacked South Ossetia when 
Ossetian forces opted to halt an offensive instead of driving further into Georgia, 
declaring that the Ossetians were “[Georgia’s] worst and most relentless enemies.”6 
When the Soviet Union finally reestablished control of the Caucasus in 1921 and 1922, 
North and South Ossetia remained divided, this time between two union republics 
rather than imperial provinces. North Ossetia was initially incorporated into the short-
lived Mountain ASSR in the North Caucasus, subordinate to the Russian SFSR; when the 
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Mountain ASSR was dissolved in 1924, North Ossetia became an autonomous oblast 
within the RSFSR.7 8 South Ossetia, meanwhile, remained under Georgian control, as it 
was made an autonomous oblast within the Georgian portion of the Transcaucasian 
SFSR.9 Ossetia thus remained divided as of 1924, but North and South Ossetia enjoyed 
equal levels of autonomy within their respective union republics. 
 While granting South Ossetia autonomy in recognition of its support of the 
Bolsheviks and in order to ensure respect for Ossetians’ rights as an ethnic minority was 
a logical decision, the inclusion of South Ossetia within the Transcaucasian SFSR, and 
later the Georgian SSR, is less straightforward. The initial decision to subordinate South 
Ossetia to Georgia was based largely on the fact that the Democratic Republic of 
Georgia had successfully established control of South Ossetia during its brief 
independence.10 There were later attempts to reunite North and South Ossetia, most 
notably a proposal made by Anastas Mikoyan in 1925, which would have created a 
single Ossetian autonomous republic within the Georgian SSR. However, Stalin denied 
this proposal out of concern that removing North Ossetia from the RSFSR would spark 
separatist movements in Chechnya, Dagestan, and Ingushetia; if these territories 
successfully left the RSFSR for the TSFSR, separatist movements would appear among 
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the Don, Terek, and Kuban Cossacks, thus planting the seeds of Great Russian 
nationalism.11 The status of North and South Ossetia was effectively finalized by the 
Constitution of 1936, which upgraded North Ossetia to an autonomous republic within 
the RSFSR, but left South Ossetia’s status as an autonomous republic within Georgia 
unchanged.12 At this point, it became clear that Ossetia would remain divided for the 
foreseeable future despite the Soviet nominal belief in national self-determination, and 
the power differentials that drove the conflict were fully established. 
 As noted above, the South Ossetians had been on equal footing with the 
Georgians until the Russian Civil War, and enjoyed the same level of autonomy as the 
Ossetians living in the North Caucasus until 1936. However, once the 1936 constitution 
was enacted, the South Ossetians found themselves in much the same situation as the 
Karabakh Armenians: they were now subordinate to an ethnic group with which they 
had been on equal footing until the Russian Civil War broke out, and they enjoyed less 
autonomy than members of their own ethnic group in a different union republic. In 
some ways, though, the South Ossetians were even worse off than the Karabakh 
Armenians. In 1932, the People’s Commissariat for Education declared the Ossetians 
“culturally backwards,” as it had with the Azeris.13 This designation effectively marked 
the Ossetians as culturally inferior to the titular nationalities of both union republics in 
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which they resided, thus creating a cultural power differential in addition to a political 
one. 
The Ossetians’ relative lack of cultural development became especially 
problematic in 1937, when Georgia began a “Georgianization” campaign in South 
Ossetia. Schools in South Ossetia were no longer allowed to use Ossetian as a language 
of instruction, using Georgian or Russian instead.14 Moreover, the Ossetian language 
had been almost exclusively a spoken language until the early 1900s, and North and 
South Ossetia lacked a common script for their shared language until 1954.15 As part of 
the Georgianization campaign of the late 1930s, an alphabet based on the Georgian 
script was imposed on the Ossetian language within South Ossetia, while Stalin’s 
ideology of the “friendship of peoples” prompted the creation and implementation of 
an Ossetian Cyrillic alphabet in North Ossetia, which had been adapting to a Latin script 
until that point.16 The elimination of Ossetian-language schooling in the Georgian SSR 
and the constant changes to the Ossetian alphabet not only hindered the Ossetians’ 
further cultural development, but also stifled Ossetian nationalism. As the Georgian 
alphabet is not used outside of Georgia, its imposition on the Ossetian language in 
South Ossetia hampered South Ossetians’ ability to communicate with anyone outside 
of the Georgian SSR, including their fellow Ossetians. This lack of a common script 
between North and South Ossetia effectively prevented the two territories from 
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communicating with each other, let alone advocating together for the reunion of 
Ossetia. 
Many aspects of the conflict between South Ossetia and Georgia, such as the 
political and cultural power differentials, stem from the fact that the Ossetians were 
divided between two union republics and lacked any ethnic or linguistic relationship to 
the titular nationality of either republic. As noted in the previous chapter, the Ossetians 
are not the only South Caucasian ethnic group in this situation, since the Armenians and 
the Lezgins are also divided across two union republics. The Ossetians’ situation is much 
closer to that of the Karabakh Armenians than the Lezgins, though. The Lezgins bear no 
ethnolinguistic relation to the Azeris, but are closely related to certain other ethnic 
groups with which they shared the Dagestan ASSR, particularly the Avars, Dargins, and 
Tsez.17 Ossetian, on the other hand, is not closely related to any other language in the 
Caucasus. It is one of only five Eastern Iranian languages spoken in the former Soviet 
Union; the other four, including its closest relative, Yaghnobi, are only spoken in 
Tajikistan.18 As such, both the North and South Ossetians were entirely unrelated to the 
titular nationality of the republic in which they resided, and the Ossetians had been split 
up and placed under the control of totally unrelated ethnic groups with little input on 
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their part and little justification save for Stalin’s fears that reunifying Ossetia would 
spark separatist movements elsewhere in the North Caucasus.  
Ossetians on both sides of the Caucasus Mountains found this separation and 
subordination galling in light of the Soviet Union’s espousal of national self-
determination, but the South Ossetians were especially incensed. During the Russian 
Civil War, between 1918 and 1920, the South Ossetians had staged three major 
uprisings against the Democratic Republic of Georgia with the support of the 
Bolsheviks.19 However, when the Red Army retook the South Caucasus, Georgia was 
placed in control of South Ossetia in recognition of the fact that Georgia had maintained 
control over South Ossetia, even though South Ossetia had supported the Bolsheviks 
and Georgia had opposed them.20 As might be expected, many South Ossetians believed 
that Soviet authorities showed favoritism to the Georgians when conflicts arose. This 
perception was heightened by the extremely high rank of Joseph Stalin, Sergo 
Ordzhonikidze, and Lavrenty Beria, all ethnic Georgians, within the government of the 
Soviet Union. Georgians were disproportionately overrepresented at the highest levels 
of Soviet government, whereas Ossetians faced far greater difficulty reaching high-level 
government posts due to their status as “culturally backwards.”21 The 
overrepresentation of Georgians and underrepresentation of Ossetians at the All-Union 
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level of government was particularly problematic in light of the power structure the 
Soviet Union had created. 
 As noted in the preceding chapter, the 1936 and 1977 constitutions of the Soviet 
Union stated that any alterations to the boundaries of union republics, the creation of 
any new lower-level territorial units, and any changes to the status of any lower-level 
territorial units had to be approved at the All-Union level of government.22 23 The 1977 
constitution additionally stipulated that the territory of a union republic could not be 
altered without the consent of the republic-level government, and stated that union 
republics were to determine their own internal subdivisions.24 These provisions in the 
Soviet constitutions effectively allowed the Georgian SSR to unilaterally impose its will 
on South Ossetia and prevented North and South Ossetia from working together 
towards reunion. Since territorial changes had to be approved by any union republics 
they affected and approved again at the All-Union level of government in order to be 
implemented, the RSFSR and the Georgian SSR would have had to separately agree to 
North and South Ossetian proposals, and any changes that those union republics agreed 
to would then have to be confirmed by the government of the Soviet Union as a whole. 
Even if North and South Ossetia did not attempt to reunite, South Ossetia was subject to 
whatever conditions the Georgian SSR imposed on it, since the boundaries and 
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autonomy level of South Ossetia were determined by the government of the Georgian 
SSR with the approval of the overarching Soviet government. Once the Soviet Union 
collapsed, however, Georgia no longer had the backing of the All-Union government, 
and the internal power structure that prevented North and South Ossetia from working 
together was gone. 
 In November 1989, as the Soviet Union was crumbling, the Supreme Soviet of 
South Ossetia attempted to take advantage of the weakening power structure by 
unilaterally upgraded South Ossetia’s status to that of an autonomous republic within 
Georgia and taking steps towards union with North Ossetia.25 Just over a year later, in 
December 1990, the government of the Georgian SSR, led by Zviad Gamsakhurdia, 
responded by declaring that South Ossetia was no longer autonomous, at which point 
armed conflict broke out between thr two parties.26 Georgia continued to grow 
increasingly unstable throughout 1991, as the country descended into poverty, no 
economic reforms were made, Gamsakhurdia was criticized for his failure to condemn 
the coup attempt against Gorbachev, and the leader of the National Guard that 
Gamsakhurdia had created began an armed rebellion against him.27 Gamsakhurdia was 
ousted in the autumn of 1991, but the Military Council of Georgia, which had 
overthrown him, refused to restore South Ossetia’s autonomy.28 The following spring, 
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the leaders of the coup that had deposed Gamsakhurdia invited Eduard Shevardnadze, 
the former head of the Communist Party of the Georgian SSR, to become Prime 
Minister, and Shevardnadze attempted to negotiate an end to the armed conflict 
between Georgia and South Ossetia. However, his attempts were stymied by the 
Georgian military restarting artillery bombardment of South Ossetia, which prompted 
Russian military intervention on behalf of the South Ossetians, and only direct 
negotiation between Shevardnadze and Boris Yeltsin managed to bring about a 
ceasefire.29 Armed conflict between Georgia and South Ossetia broke out twice more, 
first after the Rose Revolution in 2003, then in the lead-up to the 2008 Russia-Georgia 
War.30 South Ossetia has been under de facto Russian control since the 2008 conflict, 
and remains as such at present.31 
 The conflict between South Ossetia and Georgia did not begin until the Russian 
Civil War, and was initially based on ideological differences, with the South Ossetians 
supporting the Mensheviks and Georgia supporting the Bolsheviks. Further conflict 
could have been prevented by allowing both South and North Ossetians to determine 
which union republic they would belong to, which would have allowed some degree of 
national self-determination. Creating a power structure that did not allow decisions to 
be unilaterally imposed on South Ossetia from above, or at least creating an alternative 
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means for South Ossetia to request that its grievances be addressed when the Georgian 
SSR would not compromise, would have also gone a long way towards preventing the 
conflict from escalating. However, the Soviet nationality policy worsened the conflict 
and removed any means of relieving ethnic tensions. As such, when the Soviet Union 
finally collapsed and the governments of its successor states were still weak, South 




Chapter Four: Abkhazia 
 
At first glance, the conflict in Abkhazia appears extremely similar to the South Ossetia 
conflict. A smaller ethnic group with ethnic and linguistic ties to the North Caucasus was 
placed under Georgian control, despite the fact that the Georgians and the subordinate 
ethnic group have minimal ethnolinguistic connections. A “Georgianization” campaign 
created resentment, which was then fueled by the smaller group’s lack of political 
power. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, without a powerful central authority 
holding everything in check, the smaller ethnic group lashed out, and Russian 
intervention in the conflict led to a stalemate, which then devolved into a frozen 
conflict. However, there are some key differences between the conflicts in South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia – namely a longer history of cultural suppression, a higher initial 
level of autonomy within the Soviet power structure, and the lack of any closely-related 
ethnic groups in other union republics who could lobby on behalf of the Abkhaz – which 
exacerbated the effects of the Soviet nationality policy in the latter conflict. 
 Abkhazia occupies the northwestern part of Georgia, wedged between the Black 
Sea and the western end of the Caucasus Mountains. The ethnic group for which it is 
named, the Abkhaz, speak a language that is related to the Circassian languages of the 
northwestern Caucasus (Adyghe, Cherkess, and Kabardin).1 As such, like the Ossetians, 
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the Abkhaz have ethnolinguistic ties to the Russian North Caucasus. However, the 
Abkhaz were substantially worse off than either the Ossetians or the Georgians under 
imperial rule. Abkhazia was a vassal state of the Ottoman Empire between 1578 and 
1801, during which time many of its inhabitants converted to Sunni Islam.2 After the 
Russian Empire annexed eastern Georgia in 1801, Abkhazia was subjected to 63 years of 
war between the Ottoman and Russian Empires and various regional ethnic groups.3 The 
Russian Empire conquered Abkhazia in 1864, at which point it became the Sukhumi 
Okrug, and Abkhazia was separate from – but not equal to – the rest of Georgia until the 
Russian Revolution.4 
As soon as the Russian Empire established control of the area, Russian 
authorities ordered the deportation of hundreds of thousands of Abkhaz, Adyghe, 
Cherkess, and Kabardins to the Ottoman Empire via the Black Sea, and continued 
rebellion in Abkhazia resulted in more Abkhaz being deported in August 1866.5 The 
now-depopulated territory was settled by Russians, Greeks, Ukrainians, Armenians, and 
Mingrelians (a sub-group of the Georgians), all of which followed Eastern Orthodox 
Christianity.6 The Muslim Abkhaz, on the other hand, were subjected to intense 
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Russification, and following a third rebellion during the Russo-Turkish War in 1877, the 
Abkhaz were declared second-class citizens and prohibited from living in the major 
coastal towns.7 Due to Russification, the poor treatment of the Abkhaz at the hands of 
the Russian Empire, and Georgian collaboration with the Russian Empire during the 
conquest of the Caucasus, the Abkhaz grew resentful of the relative freedom the 
Georgians enjoyed. This resentment would soon prove problematic. 
 Abkhazia, like South Ossetia, was supportive of the Bolsheviks, who lent their 
support to the Kiaraz resistance movement. Led by Nestor Lakoba, a future leader of 
Soviet Abkhazia, and backed by the Bolsheviks, Kiaraz attempted to seize Sukhumi and 
set up a government there in April 1918, but was dislodged two months later by forces 
from the newly-created Democratic Republic of Georgia.8 Abkhazia was offered 
autonomous status within the DRG, but despite frequent Bolshevik insurgent activity 
and opposition from members of the Georgian Constituent Assembly, the government 
of the DRG attempted to make Georgian the official language for the entire country 
(including Abkhazia) and set up a regional government composed mainly of ethnic 
Georgians.9 Especially considering the lower status of the Abkhaz than the Georgians 
under Imperial Russian rule, these impositions only worsened Abkhazian resentment of 
the Georgians, and insurgent activity continued until Georgia was conquered by the Red 
Army in 1921. 
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 Following the Soviet conquest of the South Caucasus, Abkhazia existed as a de 
facto independent Bolshevik republic for just under a year. In February of 1922, the 
status of Abkhazia was decided: Abkhazia would be part of the Transcaucasian SFSR, on 
equal footing with Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, but associated by treaty with 
Georgia.10 As is the case with South Ossetia, the inclusion of Abkhazia in the TSFSR 
initially seems like an illogical choice, as the Abkhaz were far more closely related to the 
Adyghe, Cherkess, and Kabardins of the Russian SFSR than to the Georgians in terms of 
language and ethnicity.11 Abkhazia was intentionally placed within Georgia for much the 
same reason that South Ossetia was: to provide an internal counterweight to the far less 
pro-Bolshevik Georgians.12 For this reason, even though less than 30 percent of 
Abkhazia’s residents were ethnically Abkhaz as of 1926, Abkhazia retained its status as 
an equal of Georgia until 1931, and flourished in the 1920s and early 1930s under the 
leadership of Lakoba and the patronage of Joseph Stalin.13 However, Abkhazia’s 
happiness was not to last. The first sign of trouble was the downgrading of Abkhazia to 
an autonomous republic within Georgia (then still part of the TSFSR) in 1931, which once 
again made the Abkhaz subordinate to the Georgians.14 The following year, the People’s 
Commissariat for Education declared the Abkhaz a “culturally backwards” nationality, 
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while the Georgians, as noted in previous chapters, were declared “cultured.”15 While 
this power differential was not new for the Abkhazians, as it was for the Karabakh 
Armenians and the South Ossetians, the Abkhaz considered it reminiscent of harsh 
Imperial Russian treatment, renewing resentments of the Georgians and the Russians 
that dated back to the tsarist era. 
Additional fuel was added to the fire in 1936, when Nestor Lakoba was invited by 
Lavrenty Beria, a Mingrelian hailing from the Abkhazian capital of Sukhumi, to spend an 
evening with him and Stalin in Tbilisi; during the evening, Lakoba was poisoned and 
died.16 17 That same year, the TSFSR was dissolved, and the new Soviet constitution 
effectively ensured that Abkhazia would remain an ASSR under the control of the 
Georgian SSR by declaring that union republics had to consent to any changes in their 
boundaries and that those changes then had to be approved at the All-Union level.18 19 
An intense Georgianization campaign, directed by Beria, ensued after the death of 
Lakoba and the dissolution of the TSFSR, further reinforcing the idea that the Abkhaz 
were culturally and politically inferior to the Georgians. Lakoba was posthumously 
declared an enemy of the people, most of his family members were arrested and 
executed, and many Mingrelians and Svans (another subgroup of the Georgians) were 
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given houses in Abkhazia, bringing the proportion of ethnic Abkhaz in the territory down 
to just 18 percent of its population by 1939.20 The Abkhaz language was also converted 
from a Latin script to a Georgian one and place-names were given Georgian grammatical 
endings, both of which were seen as further attempts to reduce Abkhaz influence with 
their own territory.21 Abkhaz intellectuals were repressed, further threatening the 
survival of the Abkhaz language and culture, and many high-ranking Abkhaz party 
officials were replaced by Georgians, cementing the dominance of the Georgians over 
the Abkhaz and reducing the number of officials who might speak out against the 
treatment of the Abkhaz.22 23 The cultural repression of the Abkhaz continued even after 
Stalin died, as the Abkhaz language was switched from a Georgian to a Cyrillic script, the 
sixth alphabet the language had used in a century, in 1954.24 Thus, the power 
differential between the Abkhaz and the Russians and Georgians was at least as great as 
it had been under tsarist rule, but it was all the more galling in light of the Soviet Union’s 
advocacy for national self-determination and protection of minority rights. 
Though the Abkhaz and the Ossetians had been more or less equally culturally 
developed by the beginning of the Georgianization campaign, the Abkhaz were hit 
substantially harder. This is partly due to the aforementioned repopulation of Abkhazia 
with non-Abkhaz and replacement of Abkhaz officials, but unlike South Ossetia (and the 
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Karabakh Armenians), the Abkhaz lacked any close ethnic relatives who could lobby on 
their behalf. Though there is a small diaspora community of Abkhaz and Circassian 
peoples in Turkey as a result of the deportations in the mid-19th century, its ability to 
intervene on behalf of Abkhazia was curtailed by the establishment of NATO and 
Turkey’s inclusion therein. Within the Soviet Union, the closest relatives of the Abkhaz 
were likewise powerless to advocate for Abkhaz rights. The three Circassian ethnic 
groups – the Adyghe, the Cherkess, and the Kabardins – were divided across three 
separate autonomous republics within the RSFSR following the dissolution of the 
Mountain ASSR, and all three of them had less autonomy than the Abkhaz for at least 
part of their existence within the USSR. 
The Adyghe had only an autonomous oblast, which was entirely surrounded by 
majority-Russian Krasnodar Krai.25 The Cherkess were likewise granted an autonomous 
oblast, which they shared with the Karachai, a Turkish ethnic group to which they were 
not related, from 1922-1926.26 Though the Cherkess had an autonomous oblast to 
themselves from 1926 to 1957, they were once again placed in the same AO as the 
Karachai when the latter was returned from internal deportation.27 The Kabardins, like 
the Cherkess, shared an AO with a Turkish ethnic group, in this case the Balkars, 
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beginning in 1922.28 This territory was upgraded to an ASSR in 1936, then exclusively 
designated for the Kabardins following the deportation of the Balkars in 1943, and 
finally reconstituted as the Kabardin-Balkar ASSR with the return of the Balkars in 
1957.29 This division of the Abkhaz and the Circassian ethnic groups, as well as the 
frequent changes in administrative status of the territories in which the Circassian 
groups resided, prevented them from uniting or from effectively advocating for each 
other. As such, unlike the Ossetians and the Karabakh Armenians, there were no groups 
outside of Abkhazia who could effectively lobby on behalf of the Abkhaz. Combined with 
the way in which the power structure of the Soviet Union essentially gave the Georgian 
SSR and All-Union-level authorities complete control over the fate of the Abkhaz ASSR 
without allowing the Abkhaz a means to appeal their status, the Abkhaz felt that they 
had no choice but to accept the cultural and political dominance of the Georgians. 
Without a means of solving the conflict between the Georgians and the Abkhaz, it could 
only continue festering until, as the Soviet Union collapsed, it finally ruptured into 
armed hostilities. 
 There was a brief glimmer of hope for peaceful relations between the Abkhaz 
and the Georgians between 1977 and 1985, as Eduard Shevardnadze, leader of the 
Georgian Communist Party, agreed to make a number of concessions to the Abkhaz and 
publicly declared that earlier Georgian policies towards the Abkhaz had been 
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“chauvinistic.”30 However, a number of ethnic Georgians complained that these 
concessions denied them their privileges as the titular nationality of the Georgian SSR, 
which did nothing to improve Abkhaz-Georgian relations.31 The perestroika movement 
only increased Abkhaz suspicion towards the Georgians, as the Abkhaz feared that a 
renewed Georgian nationalist movement and demands for greater linguistic and cultural 
rights would bring about another wave of Georgianization.32 
During the collapse of the Soviet Union, Zviad Gamsakhuria, the newly-elected 
leader of the Georgian SSR, did little to allay the fears of the Abkhaz. Between 1985 and 
1991, the Abkhaz rallied in favor of remaining within the Soviet Union, afraid of what an 
independent Georgia might mean for them, while the Georgians clamored for 
independence, and tensions only escalated when multiple protests devolved into 
violence in mid-1990.33 Though Gamsakhurdia initially urged the Abkhaz to unite with 
the Georgians, saying that both were captives of Russia, the Abkhaz distrusted him due 
to his earlier unwillingness to recognize Abkhazia as separate from Georgia and rebuffed 
his offer, declaring Abkhazia’s loyalty to the Soviet Union instead.34 Gamsakhurdia then 
enacted new Georgianization policies, which seemed to confirm Abkhaz fears of 
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assimilation, but the conflict only came to a head with the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union in the winter of the same year.35 
The final dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991 and the subsequent 
ousting of Gamsakhurdia left both the Georgians and the Abkhaz on uncertain ground. 
The power-sharing deal that the two sides had agreed to in August 1991 broke down in 
the spring of 1992, and the Georgian military inherited the armor and artillery of the 
Soviet Transcaucasian Military District in July of 1992, allowing Georgia to impose its will 
on Abkhazia by force.36 Georgian troops appeared in Abkhazia the following month, and 
though the Georgian forces were better-established and managed to take Sukhumi, 
Abkhaz forces pushed some Georgian troops north into Russia, forcing Russia to 
intervene.37 There were several attempts at a ceasefire, but none held until 1994, when 
Russian troops were stationed indefinitely along the Russia-Georgia border, ostensibly 
because Georgia (by now a member of the Russian-led Commonwealth of Independent 
States) requested military assistance from the CIS in order to defeat pro-Gamsakhurdia 
forces.38 Armed hostilities ceased, but no peace deal was reached, and the dispute 
between Abkhazia and Georgia devolved into a frozen conflict. The conflict remained 
frozen until the 2008 Russia-Georgia War, at which point Russian troops began 
                                                          
35
  Smith, Red Nations, 346. 
36
 de Waal, The Caucasus, 153. 
37
 Smith, Red Nations, 346-347. 
38
 Ibid., 347. 
60 
 
occupying Abkhazia, and the territory has been under de facto Russian governance ever 
since.39 
Of the three frozen conflicts in the South Caucasus, the conflict in Abkhazia was 
perhaps the most severely affected by the Soviet nationality policy. The top-down 
system of decision-making allowed the Abkhaz to be subordinated to an unrelated 
ethnic group in order to counter anti-Soviet sentiment among the latter, and allowed 
them to be separated from their closest ethnolinguistic relatives. Favoritism towards the 
Georgians by Stalin and Beria, as well as the designation of the Abkhaz as “culturally 
backwards,” allowed the Georgian SSR to effectively disregard Soviet cultural protection 
policies with regards to the Abkhaz. Between the vast political and cultural power 
differential, the lack of any allied ethnic groups in the Soviet Union who could lobby on 
their behalf, and the way the power structure allowed policies that favored the 
Georgians to be imposed on Abkhazia, the conflict had no outlet until the Soviet Union 
collapsed. At that point, after years of the conflict brewing beneath the surface and 
without a central authority to maintain the status quo, armed conflict seemed to be the 
only solution in sight for the Abkhaz. 
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Chapter Five: Adjara 
 
While Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia all descended into armed conflict 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was one autonomous territory in the South 
Caucasus that managed to avoid conflict. The dispute over Adjara, a coastal region in 
southern Georgia, never escalated to armed hostilities as disputes in the other three 
autonomous territories did. This is largely because unique circumstances in Adjara 
helped to mitigate some of the negative side effects of the policy. Unlike the Karabakh 
Armenians, Ossetians, and Abkhaz, the Adjarians had close ethnic and linguistic ties to 
the union republic in which they were located, which helped to lessen the impact of 
newly-created power differentials and favoritism in cultural policy. As a result, the 
attempts at Georgianization that were so detested by the Ossetians and the Abkhaz had 
not had much effect on Adjara, and had therefore provoked much less resentment 
towards the Georgians. When the Soviet Union collapsed, though there was conflict 
over the status of Adjara in the newly-independent Georgia, this relative lack of bad 
blood between the two parties allowed the conflict to be peacefully resolved without 
major armed hostilities or foreign intervention. 
 Adjara occupies a small, rectangular patch of territory in southern Georgia, 
bounded by the Black Sea in the west and Turkey in the south. The region was brought 
under Imperial Russian control in 1878, when the Congress of Berlin awarded the 
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territory to the Russian Empire at the close of the Russo-Turkish War.1 Like Abkhazia, 
Adjara was ruled separately from the rest of modern-day Georgia, as it was made a 
separate territory, which was named Batumi Oblast after its administrative center and 
main port.2 By the time the Russian Empire collapsed, Batumi Oblast had become one of 
the most economically valuable regions of the South Caucasus, as the port of Batumi 
had become a shipping and transport hub for the railways and oil pipelines leading out 
of Tbilisi and Baku.3 Once the Imperial Russian government was removed from power 
and Georgia declared its independence, Adjara rapidly became a bone of contention 
among its neighbors. 
Adjara had been under Ottoman control longer than any other part of present-
day Georgia, and thus had very close ties, especially religious ties, to Turkey. As such, 
the Adjarians fought alongside the Turkish military against forces from the Democratic 
Republic of Georgia between 1918 and 1921, and were supportive of the Turkish troops 
who moved in to occupy the region in 1921.4 The leadership of the DRG, on the other 
hand, viewed Adjara (as well as neighboring territories like Kars and Hopa), as Georgian, 
and so refused to allow Turkey to establish control of the territory without a fight.5 The 
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Bolsheviks, meanwhile, moved Red Army troops into Adjara during their conquest of 
Georgia in 1921, claiming that the Adjarians had been oppressed in the same way the 
Ossetians and Abkhaz had and that the Soviet Union sought to protect such oppressed 
nationalities, though Soviet authorities likely realized the strategic importance and 
economic value of the territory and thus had more pragmatic motivations as well.6 
Control of Adjara, along with Nagorno-Karabakh and Nakhchivan, would only be 
determined by the Treaty of Kars in 1922. 
 The Treaty of Kars established that Adjara, like the Nakhchivan exclave of 
Azerbaijan, would be controlled by the Soviet Union and granted the status of an 
autonomous republic, with Turkey acting as an external guarantor of its status.7 In 
exchange for the cession of Adjara, Turkey received special trading and customs 
privileges along its land border with the Georgian SSR and at the port of Batumi.8 
Because of the terms of the Treaty of Kars, Adjara was perhaps the only autonomous 
ethnoterritorial unit in the South Caucasus whose union republic membership and level 
of autonomy made sense for reasons other than political strategizing or logistical 
importance.  
Unlike the Karabakh Armenians, South Ossetians, and Abkhazians, the Adjarians 
have very close ethnolinguistic ties to the Georgians, the titular nationality of the union 
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republic to which Adjara belongs.9 In contrast, Nagorno-Karabakh had been placed in 
the Azerbaijani SSR because the Bolsheviks viewed the consolidation of the ethnically-
diverse Azerbaijani SSR as more of a priority than satisfying the demands of the weak 
and conflict-ravaged Armenian SSR.10 Likewise, pro-Bolshevik Abkhazia had been placed 
in the Georgian SSR in order to act as an internal counterweight to the less Bolshevik-
friendly Georgians.11 South Ossetia was included in the Georgian SSR because the Soviet 
authorities hoped that the pro-Bolshevik South Ossetians would keep the Georgian 
Military Highway, which connected Russia to Georgia by way of Ossetia, open in order 
to accommodate troop movements if needed.12 Adjara was also given a level of 
autonomy that matched the relationship of the Adjarians to the Georgians. Though the 
Adjarians were very closely related to the Georgians ethnically and linguistically, the 
additional time the Adjarians had spent under Ottoman control had made their culture 
markedly different from that of the rest of Georgia. Most importantly, the Adjarians and 
Georgians were mainly distinguished by their different religions, as many Adjarians had 
converted to Sunni Islam in the 16th and 17th centuries, whereas the majority of 
Georgians had continued to follow Eastern Orthodox Christianity.13 The fact that the 
Adjarians and Georgians followed different religions, but were close ethnolinguistic 
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relatives, would prove to be critical in preventing conflict by lessening the effects of the 
Soviet cultural policies that had provoked so much resentment in South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia. 
 As was the case with the Azeris, Ossetians, and Abkhaz, the Adjarians were 
declared a “culturally backwards” nationality by the People’s Commissariat for 
Education in 1932.14 However, this declaration did not have nearly as much impact on 
the Adjarians as it did on the other three ethnic groups for two key reasons. First, the 
Adjarians used Georgian as a literary language, and the only major difference between 
the Adjarian and Georgian languages was a greater number of Turkish loanwords in the 
former.15 Second, while the Adjarians, as well as the Svans and Mingrelians, were listed 
as a separate ethnic group from the Georgians on the 1926 census, all three smaller 
groups were consolidated with the Georgians for the 1939 census.16 As such, unlike the 
South Ossetians and the Abkhaz, there was little if any cultural power differential 
between the Adjarians and the Georgians. Moreover, as most Georgians were Eastern 
Orthodox Christians and most Adjarians were Sunni Muslims, one of the only major 
cultural distinctions between the two groups was their religion.17 This distinction was 
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largely irrelevant, though, since the Soviet Union was officially atheist and generally 
secular.18 
Because of the irrelevance of their religious differences and their use of a 
common literary language, it was much more difficult for the Georgians to effectively 
implement Georgianization policies in Adjara than it was to target unrelated ethnic 
groups like the Ossetians and the Abkhaz. Moreover, the classification of the Adjarians 
as a subgroup of the Georgians from 1939 onward implied that they were already 
essentially Georgian, and that any attempt to Georgianize them would therefore be 
pointless. As such, the close relationship of the Adjarians to the Georgians effectively 
spared them from the intense Georgianization campaigns that had created so much 
resentment among the South Ossetians and the Abkhaz. Relations between Adjara and 
the Georgian SSR remained relatively peaceful, in large part due to the relative lack of 
cultural repression, until the late 1980s. However, as in South Ossetian and Abkhazia, 
the election of Zviad Gamsakhurdia as president of the Georgian SSR in 1990 would 
provoke conflict. 
Of all the leaders of the Georgian SSR, Gamsakhurdia was perhaps the most 
openly hostile towards the Adjarians. He declared that, as Muslims, the Adjarians were 
not true Georgians, called for an entirely Christian Georgia, and openly advocated for 
the abolition of Adjara’s autonomous status. 19 20 Adjara, meanwhile, found a figurehead 
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for its nationalist movement in Aslan Abashidze. A descendant of Adjarian nobility, 
Abashidze served as the deputy head of communal services for the Georgian SSR, 
managing state-owned local enterprises across the republic, and he developed a 
network of political and economic connections and enriched himself by way of kickbacks 
and bribes in the process.21 Additionally, when the Soviet Union opened its borders for 
trade and travel, Adjara’s control of Sarpi, the main port of entry on the Turkish-
Georgian border, made it a strategically and economically valuable area and therefore 
gave Adjara a certain amount of leverage.22 The drastic increase in commerce between 
Turkey and Georgia also created circumstances in which bribery and protection rackets 
were common, and Abashidze managed to use his connections to profit off of the 
racketeering.23 24 While Abashidze was consolidating his power, Gamsakhurdia’s 
supporters in Adjara, all of whom were Christian Georgians, were taking advantage of 
their victory in the 1990 parliamentary elections by forcing the remaining Communist 
officials in Adjara to quit their posts.25 The tensions between Abashidze and the Adjarian 
nationalists on the one hand, and Gamsakhurdia and his supporters on the other, 
seemingly came to a head in April of 1990. 
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On April 20, 1990, a massive rally took place in the regional capital of Batumi, its 
participants apparently brought in by buses that Abashidze had commissioned from the 
garages and factories that he managed.26 Brass bands performed the Soviet national 
anthem while elderly villagers recited Muslim prayers in defiance of Gamsakhurdia’s 
anti-Soviet and anti-Islamic policies, and protestors demanded the preservation of 
Adjara’s autonomous status.27 Gamsakhurdia’s followers in Adjara resigned in response 
to the pressure, allowing Abashidze to take control of the region, and Gamsakhurdia 
himself was deposed in a coup and expelled from Georgia the following year.28 29 
Abashidze strengthened his grip on Adjara and his popularity by recruiting almost a 
tenth of the male population of Adjara into the region’s police and customs services, 
which he then used to prevent warlords from entering the territory during the conflicts 
of 1991-1994, allowing Adjara to enjoy relative peace.30 31 Despite the lull, however, the 
conflict between Georgia and Adjara was not yet over. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the resultant loss of state subsidies brought 
severe economic hardship to Adjara, just as it did in the rest of Georgia and elsewhere in 
the former Soviet Union, but corruption within his personal regime ensured that 
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Abashidze was unaffected by the economic troubles.32 Additionally, the new leader of 
Georgia, Eduard Shevardnadze, was preoccupied with the much more severe conflicts in 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and as such was largely willing to give Adjara free rein.33 By 
1997, however, the conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia had devolved into 
stalemates, and conflict again broke out between Adjara and the Georgian central 
government. In late 1997, Shevardnadze’s party refused to allow Abashidze to declare 
Adjara a free economic zone, and Abashidze’s party boycotted the meetings of the 
Georgian parliament the following spring in response.34 This political stalemate, in which 
Abashidze held the central government at arm’s length while running Adjara as a 
personal fiefdom of sorts, would continue until 2003. 
Widespread electoral fraud during the 2003 parliamentary election, which was at 
its worst in Adjara, provoked massive protests among supporters of the opposition 
parties.35 In response, Shevardnadze requested help from Abashidze, who sent several 
busloads of paid protestors to Tbilisi, but the demonstrators were unenthusiastic and 
vastly outnumbered by the supporters of opposition leader Mikheil Saakashvili.36 The 
protestors Abashidze had sent were soon brought back to Adjara, and Abashidze was 
ousted and replaced by Saakashvili a few days later in what would come to be called the 
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Rose Revolution.37 Like his predecessors Gamsakhurdia and Shevardnadze, Saakashvili 
soon attempted to weaken Abashidze’s hold on Adjara and bring the territory back 
under control of the central Georgian government, bringing Adjara and Georgia into 
conflict one last time. 
Adjara, led by Abashidze, and Georgia, now led by Saakashvili, reached the brink 
of conflict a third time in the winter of 2003. Saakashvili’s promises to root out 
governmental corruption had made him popular across Georgia, but resonated 
especially strongly in Adjara. Due to Abashidze’s firm grip on power, trade deals with 
Turkey, and corruption, Adjarians were hoping for political change and still suffering 
from economic hardship, while Abashidze continued to amass wealth from kickbacks 
and remained in power despite having supported the ousted Shevardnadze.38 As Adjara 
had almost entirely been spared from the excesses of Soviet-era Georgianization 
policies, the Adjarians were neither enthusiastic about separating from Georgia nor 
particularly resentful of the central government, and as a result of Abashidze’s behavior, 
they now preferred Saakashvili and the Georgian government that he represented over 
Abashidze. In the spring of 2004, demonstrations against Abashidze began to take place 
across Adjara, and tensions finally came to a head in May.39 In response to mounting 
pressure to resign, the bridges leading into Adjara from the rest of Georgia were 
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destroyed on Abashidze’s orders, but the protests in Adjara only intensified and 
Georgian troops massed on the internal border between Georgia and Adjara, and on 
May 6, Abashidze fled for Russia.40 Despite Abashidze’s abdication, Saakashvili allowed 
Adjara to retain its autonomy, and there has not been conflict between Georgia and 
Adjara since.41 
In contrast to Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia, the conflict in 
Adjara never escalated to the point of armed hostilities, largely because the close 
ethnolinguistic relationship between Adjara and Georgia mitigated the negative side 
effects of the Soviet nationality policy. Because the Adjarians were closely related to the 
titular nationality of the union republic to which they belonged, irredentism was not an 
issue as it was in Nagorno-Karabakh and South Ossetia. Additionally, the close ties 
between the two ethnic groups defeated the purpose of Georgianization policies, so 
Adjara did not experience the cultural repression that the Ossetians and the Abkhaz did. 
As a result, the Adjarians generally did not feel that they had experienced cultural 
repression or been denied national self-determination, and thus had very little, if any, 
resentment for the Georgian central government. Finally, the presence of a reformist 
leader in Saakashvili following the Rose Revolution gave Adjarians an alternative to 
Abashidze. This combination of good relations between Adjarians and Georgians in 
general, personal corruption within the Abashidze regime, and a viable alternative in 
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Saakashvili made closer cooperation with the central government more appealing to 
Adjarians than continued de facto independence under Abashidze, allowing Georgia to 
bring Adjara back under its control without a fight. 
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Conclusion: Current Status of Conflicts and Prospects for Resolution 
 
As detailed in previous chapters, the conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, and 
Abkhazia began with the creation of new power differentials between those ethnic 
groups and the titular nationalities of the union republics in which they were located. 
The ability of these minority groups to advocate for their desires was further hindered 
by their administrative separation from fellow members of their own ethnic group, or 
other closely-related groups, that could speak up on their behalf. Additionally, change 
was made nearly impossible because the autonomy level of each ethnic group was laid 
out in the Soviet Constitutions of 1936 and 1977, meaning that any changes in status 
could be seen as an attempt to deprive one of the ethnic groups involved of something 
that it had been constitutionally guaranteed. Finally, the top-down power structure of 
the Soviet Union meant that the central government was the only authority that could 
arbitrate conflicts and guarantee the autonomy of the smaller ethnic groups. When the 
Soviet Union collapsed, with tensions building over unresolved conflicts, no central 
authority to mediate the disputes, and the autonomy of the smaller ethnic groups in 
jeopardy, armed hostilities broke out in an attempt to settle the various disputes. This 
final chapter will discuss the current status of the three unresolved frozen conflicts 
(Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia), and whether they might be resolved 
in the foreseeable future. This chapter will also examine various factors that complicate 
the resolution of these conflicts. 
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 The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is perhaps the most complicated of the three to 
resolve. Numerous ceasefires have been declared only to fall through, with the most 
recent failure occurring on April 2, 2016.1 The most recent ceasefire was announced on 
April 5, and has held as of May 3.2 As noted in Chapter 2, Nagorno-Karabakh is currently 
an unrecognized state with de facto independence, but is still nominally under 
Azerbaijani control.3 Further resolution of the conflict appears unlikely at this point, 
however, given the extremely tense relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan and the 
complex web of alliances surrounding the conflict. Armenia is primarily allied with 
Russia, which is the only country allied with Armenia that wields any substantial power 
in the South Caucasus. Azerbaijan, on the other hand, is allied with Turkey due to their 
close ethnic and linguistic ties. Turkey has called on Armenia to give up its claims on 
Nagorno-Karabakh since at least 2003, and current President of Turkey Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan promised that he would fight shoulder-to-shoulder with Azerbaijan against the 
occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh after his election as Prime Minister in 2011.4 5 As 
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Turkey is a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Azerbaijan is thus loosely 
allied with NATO.6 Considering the conflict that erupted in Ukraine after the removal of 
Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych in 2014 and the country’s subsequent shift away from 
Russia and towards NATO and the European Union, as well as the failure to negotiate a 
solution to the Ukrainian crisis in the ensuing two years, the Russia-NATO polarization of 
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict means that this conflict is unlikely to be resolved until 
tensions between Russia and NATO are relaxed.  
The Armenian diaspora is an additional complicating factor in the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict. Some of the more powerful and/or populous members of NATO, 
especially France and the United States, are home to large diaspora-Armenian 
communities.7 As such, NATO member states with a substantial Armenian community 
face an impasse. Siding with Armenia in the conflict could provoke outrage in Turkey on 
behalf of Azerbaijan. Turkey’s crucial position on the Black Sea, especially considering 
the threat of ISIS in the Middle East and Russian actions in Crimea, means that keeping 
Turkey in NATO is strategically critical for the organization. As such, offending the 
Turkish government by siding with Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict could 
prove disastrous for NATO. On the other hand, if NATO or its individual members were 
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to side with Azerbaijan, this could cause an outcry from the substantial Armenian 
diaspora communities in the United States and France. As such, even if Russian interests 
in the conflict are not taken into account, it is in the best interests of NATO member 
states with large Armenian diaspora communities to not take a side in the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict, further hindering its resolution. 
Tensions between NATO and Russia are also in play in the conflicts in South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia. Georgia, like Azerbaijan, is loosely allied with NATO, though it is 
not a member.8 Additionally, Georgia is actively cooperating with and seeking accession 
into NATO.9 However, Abkhazia and South Ossetia maintain close diplomatic ties with 
Russia. South Ossetia has been under de facto Russian control since 2007, when 
delegates at the Sixth Congress of the Ossetian People voted for the reunion of North 
and South Ossetia within Russia.10 Abkhazia, along with South Ossetia, rejected then-
President of Georgia Eduard Saakashvili’s offer of autonomy within Georgia in the spring 
of 2007.11 Just over a year later, Abkhazia agreed to allow Russian troops to occupy the 
territory in exchange for guarantees of its security.12 The Russia-Georgia War in 2008 
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further reinforced Russia’s de facto control of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.13 14 
Additionally, both territories signed “Treat[ies] of Alliance and Integration” with Russia 
in November 2014 and January 2015, respectively.15 16 Thus, as in the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict, the NATO-Russia polarization is in play, and the conflicts in Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia are unlikely to be resolved until tensions between Russia and NATO 
are relaxed. 
The unwillingness of the participants in these conflicts to compromise further 
reduces the odds that any of these conflicts will be resolved in the foreseeable future. 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the Karabakh Armenians all refuse to offer concessions until at 
least one of the other parties makes concessions. Nagorno-Karabakh insists on legal 
recognition of independence before any final decision is made regarding its status; 
Armenia wants the question of Nagorno-Karabakh’s status resolved before Armenian 
military forces are removed from the region, whereas Azerbaijan refuses to negotiate 
until Armenian forces are withdrawn.17 Elsewhere in the South Caucasus, South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia are unlikely to agree to reunification with Georgia as long as de facto 
control by Russia remains a viable alternative option, and Georgia is unlikely to 
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compromise if its leaders feel that Russia is pressuring them to do so.18 As such, even if 
these conflicts were not complicated by alliances and NATO-Russia tensions, the 
unwillingness of any involved parties to compromise would still preclude the resolution 
of these conflicts. 
All three of the unresolved ethnic conflicts in the South Caucasus are thus 
extremely unlikely to be resolved in the foreseeable future, barring drastic changes in 
diplomatic relations between the parties involved. Each of these conflicts has been 
festering for eighty years, creating lasting resentments between the actors in these 
conflicts, and unwillingness to compromise and a complex web of alliances and tensions 
further preclude the possibility of resolution. Despite periodic efforts by various external 
actors to intervene and resolve the conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, and 
Abkhazia, it is unlikely that any substantial and lasting change in the status of these 
conflicts will be achieved anytime soon. 
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